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1 Introduction
Risk shifting is a well-known agency problem in corporate finance between shareholders and bond-
holders of a corporation (Jensen and Meckling [9], Green [8], MacMinn [10]). The limited liability
protection provides incentives for management acting in the interests of shareholders to select
riskier projects at the expense of bondholders. If management cannot credibly commit not to un-
dertake those projects, bondholders demand an appropriate interest rate differential which reflects
the agency cost.
Policyholders of a stock insurance company face a situation similar to that of bondholders
of a corporation. By paying premiums, policyholders provide capital which is senior to equity
but under the investment decision of management acting in the interest of shareholders. Limited
liability provides incentives for management to increase the risk of the insurer’s assets and liabilities
by, for example, increasing the risk of the asset portfolio, selling additional policies without a
corresponding injection of equity, or by changing the reinsurance arrangements or strategies in
asset liability management accordingly. This increase in the stock insurer’s risk may raise the
insolvency probability of the insurer and consequently reduce the value policyholders attach to
and the premium they are willing to pay for the insurance contract.
We provide a formal framework to study the conflict of interest between risk-neutral share-
holders of an insurance corporation and its risk-averse policyholders. Shareholders have access
to a technology through which they can increase the risk of the insurer’s assets. We represent
the technology by the possibility of investing the total capital of the insurer, including equity and
premium payments, in a risky asset. Different risk profiles of the insurer’s assets are identified
by different fractions of the insurer’s total capital invested in the risky asset. While increasing
the risk of the insurer’s assets may serve shareholders’ interests, it may reduce the premium levels
policyholders are willing to pay and thereby the total capital available for shareholders to invest.
In this context, we characterize the set of Pareto optimal investment and premium policies.
We show that, for any policyholders’ or shareholders’ reservation utility level, there exists a Pareto
optimum and, under some mild assumption, it is unique. Moreover, we specify the necessary and
sufficient condition for the Pareto optimum.
We then investigate the risk shifting problem between shareholders and policyholders, that
is, the setting in which shareholders cannot credibly commit to a specific investment strategy
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before policies are sold and premiums are paid. This agency problem generically leads to Pareto
suboptimal investment policies and corresponding premium levels. The investment technology
implies that the risk shifting problem admits only the boundary solution where the entire insurer’s
capital is invested in the risky asset.
Last, we analyze the effect of solvency regulation in the context of this agency problem. Solvency
regulation imposes a constraint on the set of possible investment and premium policies. We model
the regulatory constraint by some general convex risk measure and characterize the corresponding
solution. We show that there exists a unique investment strategy and premium level that solves
the risk shifting problem under the regulatory constraint and analyze its effect on the inefficiency
of the risk shifting problem. Finally, we calibrate our model to an European Economic Area non-
life insurer average portfolio taken from the QIS3 (Quantitative Impact Study 3) Benchmarking
Study [4] of the Chief Risk Officer Forum under the Solvency II standard model [2, 3] and illustrate
our analytical results.
Our paper relates to the literature on the risk shifting problem in corporate finance (Jensen and
Meckling [9]). Green [8] presents a formal model in which entrepreneurs decide on the allocation
of funds across two mutually non-exclusive projects where one project is riskier than the other in
the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz [18]. The investment technology exhibits some scale function
which is strictly concave in the amount invested in each project. The author shows that the agency
conflict leads to an overinvestment in the riskier project and discusses the role of convertible bonds
in eliminating the risk shifting problem. MacMinn [10] analyzes the risk shifting problem with two
mutually exclusive projects but with a linear scale function. The author shows that a sufficiently
high level of leverage is necessary to induce the firm to switch from the less risky to the riskier
project and thereby to generate an agency cost. Furthermore, there is a set of convertible contracts
that eliminate the risk shifting problem. We contribute to this literature by analyzing the risk
shifting problem in the insurance setting where the two parties have differing costs of bearing risk
and which includes insurance losses as an additional source of risk. Moreover, we examine the effect
of solvency regulation on the agency cost of the risk shifting problem. The investment technology
in our model can be interpreted as two projects which are mutually non-exclusive (as in Green [8])
and exhibit a linear scale function (as in MacMinn [10]).
Our paper also relates to the insurance literature that discusses the conflicts of interest between
shareholders and policyholders of a stock insurer. Mayers and Smith [12], [13] discuss an agency
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problem in the context of dividend policies. After policies have been sold, shareholders have an
incentive to increase the value of their claim by raising dividends at the expense of policyholders.
They argue that the mutual organizational form of an insurance company can help internalize
this agency problem. Doherty [5] shows how an increase in the risk of the insurer’s asset portfolio
increases the shareholders’ position at the expense of policyholders. We contribute to this literature
by providing a formal model to investigate this conflict of interest and examine the effect of solvency
regulation under the agency problem. This framework allows us to determine the specific conditions
for existence and uniqueness of Pareto optimal risk structures and premium levels, for the solutions
under the agency problem, and under solvency regulation.
Last, we contribute to the literature that analyzes the effect of regulation in insurance markets.
Munch and Smallwood [16] and Finsinger and Pauly [7] analyze the optimal amount of shareholder
capital and investment risk of an insurance company under the assumption that shareholders cannot
influence the risk structure of the insurer’s assets and that insurance premiums are independent
of the insurer’s insolvency risk. Munch and Smallwood [16] argue that regulation may reduce
the insolvency risk if shareholder capital is low. Finsinger and Pauly [7], however, argue that
regulation of insurance companies may be unnecessary in the long run with building up reserves.
McCabe and Witt [14] and MacMinn and Witt [11] analyze the effect of different regulatory
schemes on the optimal investment and underwriting activity of an insurer under the assumption
that the demand function for insurance is independent of the insurer’s probability of insolvency.
Rees et al. [17] relax this assumption and show that if policyholders are fully informed about the
insurer’s insolvency risk then regulation serves no purpose. In our framework, shareholders decide
on the investment strategy, policyholders are perfectly informed or, under the agency problem,
have rational expectations about the corresponding risk, and premiums therefore depend on the
implied insolvency risk. Moreover, we examine the effect of solvency regulation on the agency cost.
The paper is structured as follows. We set up our model in Section 2 and characterize the set
of Pareto optimal policies in Section 3. In Section 4, we examine the risk shifting problem and
solvency regulation. In Section 5, we calibrate our model to data and illustrate our results. We
conclude in Section 6.
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2 Setup
We consider a one-period economy with two agents, a policyholder and a shareholder. The poli-
cyholder is endowed with some initial wealth w0 and faces a random loss X. His preferences are
characterized by some Bernoulli utility function u : R→ R.
The shareholder is risk-neutral. He owns a stock insurance company with initial capital c0 > 0
which offers full insurance coverage for X in exchange for a premium p. The shareholder has access
to a technology which allows him to increase the insurer’s risk. We represent this technology by
an investment opportunity in a risky asset that yields a random return R. The shareholder thus
decides on the fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the total capital, c0 + p, to be invested in the risky asset. The
risk-free interest rate is assumed to be zero or, equivalently, all values are in units of the risk-free
numeraire. We assume that the shareholder has only access to the investment technology if he
sells insurance. He may thus be willing to accept a negative premium p > −c0 to gain access
to the investment technology. We denote the set of investment and premium policies (α, p) by
P = [0, 1]× (−c0,∞).
The investment decision of the shareholder can be interpreted as an allocation decision of funds
across two projects, a risk-free project with return zero and a risky project with random return R.
Moreover, the two projects are mutually non-exclusive (as in Green [8]) and exhibit a linear scale
function (as in MacMinn [10]). For E [R] = 0, the project with return R is riskier in the sense
of Rothschild and Stiglitz [18]. Allocating a higher fraction α of the total capital, c0 + p, to the
risky asset thus increases the risk of the insurer’s assets and liabilities. This can be achieved, for
example, by increasing the risk of the insurer’s asset portfolio, by reducing the duration matching
of assets and liabilities, or by increasing the attachment point of reinsurance contracts.
The end of the period surplus is given by (c0 + p)(1 + αR)−X. If the surplus is negative, the
insurance company is insolvent and the shareholder is protected by limited liability. In this case,
the policyholder receives the remaining assets, (c0 +p)(1 +αR). Consequently, the terminal payoff
to the shareholder equals
((c0 + p)(1 + αR)−X)+
while the terminal wealth of the policyholder is given by
w0 − p− (X − (c0 + p)(1 + αR))+.
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The corresponding utility of the shareholder and the policyholder as a function of α and p is
USH(α, p) = E
[
((c0 + p)(1 + αR)−X)+
]
and
UPH(α, p) = E
[
u
(
w0 − p− (X − (c0 + p)(1 + αR))+
)]
,
respectively.
Assumption 2.1. Throughout the paper, we make the following standing assumptions:
(i) u is increasing, concave, and twice differentiable on R with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, limx→−∞ u(x) =
−∞ and limx→−∞ u′(x) =∞.
(ii) (X,R) takes values in R+× [−1,∞) and admits a jointly continuous density function f(x, r).
(iii) The solvency event S(α, p) = {(c0 +p)(1+αR) ≥ X} has positive probability, P[S(α, p)] > 0,
for all (α, p) ∈ P.
(iv) u and f are such that USH and UPH are real-valued and differentiable in some neighborhood
of P, and the following formal manipulations (e.g. changing the order of differentiation and
integration) are meaningful.1
Lemmas A.1–A.3 in the appendix illustrate the qualitative behavior of the shareholder and
policyholder utility function on P. In the sequel we will draw on these results without further
mention. From Lemma A.1 we know that UPH(1, p) is strictly concave in p. Hence there exists a
unique critical premium level pcritPH ∈ [−c0,∞) which maximizes the policyholder utility for α = 1,
UPH(1, p
crit
PH) = max
p∈[−c0,∞)
UPH(1, p).
We denote the corresponding critical shareholder and policyholder utility levels by γcritSH = USH(1, p
crit
PH)
1For example, it is sufficient (but not necessary) that f has compact support.
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and γcritPH = UPH(1, p
crit
PH), and define the intervals
2
ΓSH =

(γcritSH ,∞) = (0,∞), if pcritPH = −c0,
[γcritSH ,∞), if pcritPH > −c0,
ΓPH =

(−∞, γcritPH ), if pcritPH = −c0,
(−∞, γcritPH ], if pcritPH > −c0.
3 Pareto Optimal Investment and Premium Policies
In this setup, we now examine optimal policies (α, p) ∈ P in the following sense:
Definition 3.1. The policy (α∗, p∗) ∈ P is Pareto optimal if there does not exist any other policy
(α, p) ∈ P such that USH(α, p) ≥ USH(α∗, p∗) and UPH(α, p) ≥ UPH(α∗, p∗) with strict inequality
for at least one of them.
We first show that Pareto optimality is equivalent to a constrained optimization problem.
Theorem 3.2. For any policy (α∗, p∗) ∈ P, the following are equivalent:
(i) (α∗, p∗) is Pareto optimal.
(ii) (α∗, p∗) solves the constrained optimization problem
max
(α,p)∈P
UPH(α, p)
s.t. USH(α, p) ≥ γSH
(1)
for the shareholder’s reservation utility level γSH = USH(α
∗, p∗), and γSH ∈ ΓSH .
(iii) (α∗, p∗) solves the constrained optimization problem
max
(α,p)∈P
USH(α, p)
s.t. UPH(α, p) ≥ γPH
(2)
for the policyholder’s reservation utility level γPH = UPH(α
∗, p∗), and γPH ∈ ΓPH .
2Note that pcritPH = −c0 if and only if γcritSH = 0.
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Moreover, in either of the above optimization problems, (1) and (2), the respective reservation
utility constraint is binding.
Proof. (i)⇒(ii): let (α∗, p∗) ∈ P be Pareto optimal. Then clearly (α∗, p∗) solves the constrained
optimization problem (1). It remains to be shown that γSH ∈ ΓSH . If (α∗, p∗) = (1, pcritPH) or if
pcritPH = −c0 then there is nothing to prove. So assume that (α∗, p∗) 6= (1, pcritPH) ∈ P. In view of
Lemma A.3 (iv), we have UPH(α
∗, p∗) < UPH(1, pcritPH). But then, by Pareto optimality of (α
∗, p∗),
we must have γSH = USH(α
∗, p∗) > USH(1, pcritPH) = γ
crit
SH . This proves the claim.
(ii)⇒(i): let (α∗, p∗) ∈ P be a maximizer of (1). We argue by contradiction and assume that
(α∗, p∗) is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists some policy (α¯, p¯) ∈ P such that UPH(α¯, p¯) ≥
UPH(α
∗, p∗) and USH(α¯, p¯) ≥ γSH = USH(α∗, p∗) with strict inequality for at least one of them. If
UPH(α¯, p¯) > UPH(α
∗, p∗) then clearly (α∗, p∗) cannot be an optimizer of (1). Hence we can assume
that USH(α¯, p¯) > γSH and UPH(α¯, p¯) = UPH(α
∗, p∗). Then there exists a neighborhood O of (α¯, p¯)
in P such that USH(α, p) ≥ γSH for all (α, p) ∈ O. By Lemma A.2 below, ∇UPH(α¯, p¯) 6= 0, and
∂pUPH(α¯, p¯) < 0 if α¯ = 0 in particular. Moreover, if α¯ = 1 then USH(1, p¯) > γSH ≥ γcritSH =
USH(1, p
crit
PH) implies p¯ > p
crit
PH and thus ∂pUPH(α¯, p¯) < 0 again. Hence in either case we conclude
that there exists some (α, p) ∈ O with UPH(α, p) > UPH(α¯, p¯) ≥ UPH(α∗, p∗), whence (α∗, p∗)
does not solve (1), which is absurd. Hence (α∗, p∗) is Pareto optimal. Moreover, this shows that
the reservation utility constraint USH(α, p) ≥ γSH is binding.
The equivalence (i)⇔(iii) follows similarly but simpler, since ∂pUSH(α, p) > 0 by Lemma A.2.
Pareto optimal investment and premium policies can thus be generated by a take-it-or-leave-it
offer either of the policyholder to the shareholder (optimization problem (1)) or of the shareholder
to the policyholder (optimization problem (2)). The participation constraint is binding in either
case because both the policyholder’s and shareholder’s preferences are locally non-satiated.
Note that part (ii) of Theorem 3.2 implies that there exists no Pareto optimal policy for a
shareholder utility level γSH /∈ ΓSH . In fact, as for the existence of Pareto optimal policies, we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. For any reservation utility level γSH ∈ ΓSH and γPH ∈ ΓPH , respectively, there
exists at least one Pareto optimum (α∗, p∗) ∈ P with USH(α∗, p∗) = γSH and UPH(α∗, p∗) = γPH ,
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respectively. It satisfies the first order condition
E
[
Ru′
(
w0 − p∗ − (X − (c0 + p∗)(1 + α∗R))+
)]

≤ 0, if α∗ = 0,
= 0, if 0 < α∗ < 1,
≥ 0, if α∗ = 1.
(3)
Moreover, for any α∗ ∈ [0, 1] there exists at most one Pareto optimum.
Proof. In view of Theorem 3.2, it is enough to consider the optimization problems (1) and (2),
respectively. First note that, in view of Lemmas A.1 and A.2, UPH(α, p) is strictly concave and
USH(α, p) is strictly increasing in p, for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, for any fixed α ∈ [0, 1], there
can be at most one Pareto optimum. Moreover, by Lemma A.3, we have ΓSH ⊆ USH(P) and
ΓPH = UPH(P). Hence the constraint sets in (1) and (2) are non-empty. Lemma A.3 (iii) implies
that for any γPH ∈ ΓPH the level set {UPH ≥ γPH} ⊂ P is compact in P. Since UPH and USH
are continuous on P, we conclude that the maximum in both optimization problems (1) and (2),
and thus the Pareto optimum at the respective reservation utility level, is attained in P.
For the derivation of the first order condition, it is convenient to introduce the following dif-
feomorphism:
P → V = {(v, w) | 0 < v ≤ w <∞}
(α, p) 7→ (v, w) = ((c0 + p)α, c0 + p).
Note that w is the total asset value of the insurer and v is the money invested in the stock
market. The corresponding utility of the shareholder and the policyholder as a function of the new
coordinates (v, w) is
VSH(v, w) = E
[
(w + vR−X)+]
VPH(v, w) = E
[
u
(
w0 + c0 − w − (X − w − vR)+
)]
,
(4)
so that VSH(v, w) = USH(α, p) and VPH(v, w) = UPH(α, p). For simplicity of notation, we use the
same letter S(v, w) = S(α, p) for the respective solvency event.
We note that VSH is a convex and VPH is a concave function jointly in (v, w). In contrast, USH
and UPH do not share these properties as functions jointly in (α, p) in general.
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By Lemma A.4, we have ∂wVPH < 0. Hence, for any γSH ∈ ΓSH , the implicit function
theorem yields a continuously differentiable function W : I → (0,∞) on some interval I ⊂ R+
with (v,W (v)) ∈ V, VSH(v,W (v)) = γSH , and
W ′(v) = − ∂vVSH(v,W (v))
∂wVSH(v,W (v))
= −E
[
R 1S(v,w)
]
P [S(v, w)] . (5)
Since for every fixed α ∈ [0, 1] the function VSH(αw,w) = USH(α,w − c0) is strictly increasing in
w and maps the interval (0,∞) onto itself, we can assume that I = [0, v′] for some v′ > 0, and
that W (0) = 0 and W (v′) = v′.
We now characterize the critical points for the policyholder utility function along the level curve
(v,W (v)). A calculation shows
d
dv
VPH(v,W (v)) = ∂vVPH(v,W (v)) +W
′(v)∂wVPH(v,W (v))
= E
[
Ru′(w0 + c0 −X + vR) 1S(v,w)c
]
+
E
[
R 1S(v,w)
]
P [S(v, w)] u
′(w0 + c0 − w)P [S(v, w)]
= E
[
Ru′
(
w0 + c0 −W (v)− (X −W (v)− vR)+
)]
.
(6)
Hence any Pareto optimal (v∗, w∗) ∈ V satisfies
E
[
Ru′
(
w0 + c0 − w∗ − (X − w∗ − v∗R)+
)]

≤ 0, if v∗ = 0,
= 0 if 0 < v∗ < w∗,
≥ 0, if v∗ = w∗.
This proves (3).
In this theorem, we have shown the existence of Pareto optimal investment and premium policies
for any admissible reservation utility level of the policyholder or the shareholder. This result is
thus valid for different degrees of competition in the insurance market which can be represented
by different reservation utility levels. A higher degree of competition in the insurance market is
reflected by a lower reservation utility level of the shareholder. In a perfectly competitive market,
the shareholder reservation utility level is given by γSH = c0, derived from his outside option of
not selling insurance.
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In the following theorem, we specify the condition under which the Pareto optimum is unique
and under which the first order condition (3) is also sufficient.
Theorem 3.4. Assume that E[R] 6= 0 or that, for any (α, p) ∈ P, either the insolvency event has
positive probability, P [S(α, p)c] > 0, or E [R 1S(α,p)] 6= 0. Then for any reservation utility level
γSH ∈ ΓSH and γPH ∈ ΓPH , respectively, there exists a unique Pareto optimum (α∗, p∗) ∈ P.
Moreover, the first order condition (3) is also sufficient for Pareto optimality of (α∗, p∗) ∈ P.
Proof. We use the (v, w)-coordinates as introduced in the proof of Theorem 3.3. Fix γSH ∈ ΓSH ,
and let W : I → (0,∞) be the corresponding level curve as in the proof of Theorem 3.3. In view
of (5) and (6), the second derivative of VPH(v,W (v)) equals
3
d2
dv2
VPH(v,W (v)) = −W ′(v)E
[
R 1S(v,W (v))
]
u′′ (w0 + c0 −W (v))
+ E
[
R2 u′′ (w0 + c0 −X + vR) 1S(v,W (v))c
]
=
E
[
R 1S(v,W (v))
]2
P [S(v,W (v))] u
′′ (w0 + c0 −W (v))
+ E
[
R2 u′′ (w0 + c0 −X + vR) 1S(v,W (v))c
]
,
which under the assumption of the theorem is negative. Indeed, both summands on the right hand
side are non-positive. If the insolvency event has positive probability, P[S(v,W (v))c] > 0, then the
second term is negative. Otherwise P[S(v,W (v))] = 1 and thus E [R 1S(v,W (v))]2 = E [R]2 > 0, so
that the first term is negative. Hence VSH(v,W (v)) is strictly concave in v ∈ I. This proves the
theorem.
In the proof of this theorem, it is shown that, under very mild assumptions, the policyholder’s
utility as a function of α along a shareholder’s level curve, USH(α, p) = γSH , can only assume
three shapes. Either it is strictly decreasing in which case α∗ = 0 is the Pareto optimal investment
policy. Or it is strictly increasing in which case α∗ = 1 is the Pareto optimal investment policy.
Last, it can take a unique inner maximum 0 < α∗ < 1 and is strictly increasing to the left and
strictly decreasing to the right. In each of these three cases, the Pareto optimal premium policy
p∗ is uniquely defined by USH(α∗, p∗) = γSH .
3The differentiation under the expectation sign is justified by Assumption 2.1, see the proof of Lemma A.2 below.
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Remark 3.5. Along similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.4, but under the more stringent
assumption that E
[
R 1S(α,p)
]
> 0 for all (α, p) ∈ P, one can show that also the shareholder’s
utility along a policyholder’s level curve, UPH = γPH , can only assume the afore mentioned three
shapes: increasing, decreasing, or first increasing and then decreasing.4 Again, the respective
Pareto optimal policy is uniquely defined.
We terminate this section with a generic example where there exists no inner Pareto optimum
(α∗, p∗) ∈ P with investment policy α∗ > 0.
Example 3.6. For this example we assume that
(i) X and R are independent,
(ii) E[R] = 0,
(iii) P [S(α, p)c] > 0 for all (α, p) ∈ P.
In particular, the assumption in Theorem 3.4 is satisfied. Now fix an arbitrary policy (α, p) ∈ P
with α > 0. We claim that
E
[
Ru′
(
w0 − p− (X − (c0 + p)(1 + αR))+
)]
< 0. (7)
This together with the first order condition (3) and Theorem 3.4 then implies that the set of all
Pareto optimal policies in P is given by {(0, p∗) | p∗ ∈ (−c0,∞)}. For the proof of (7) we first
observe that
u′
(
w0 − p− (X − (c0 + p)(1 + αR))+
)
≤ u′ (w0 − p− (X − (c0 + p))+) on {R ≥ 0}
≥ u′ (w0 − p− (X − (c0 + p))+) on {R < 0}
4Since ∂wVPH < 0, the implicit function theorem yields a C
1-policyholder utility level curve v 7→ W (v) in V.
Some calculations show that d
dv
VSH(v,W (v)) =
E[Ru′(w0+c0−W (v)−(X−W (v)−vR)+)]
u′(w0+c0−W (v)) . Further one can show that
for critical points v∗ where d
dv
VSH(v
∗,W (v∗)) = 0 we have W ′(v∗) < 0 and
d2
dv2
VSH(v,W (v))|v=v∗ = −W ′(v∗)
u′′ (w0 + c0 −W (v∗))E
[
R 1S(v∗,W (v∗))
]
u′(w0 + c0 −W (v∗))
+
E
[
R2 u′′ (w0 + c0 −X + v∗R) 1S(v∗,W (v∗))c
]
u′(w0 + c0 −W (v∗))
.
From this we conclude that d
2
dv2
VSH(v,W (v))|v=v∗ < 0. Hence every critical point is a local maximum. This shows
that VSH(v,W (v)) has the desired properties.
12
with strict inequalities on S(α, p)c ∩ {R > 0} and S(α, p)c ∩ {R < 0}, respectively. Hence
Ru′
(
w0 − p− (X − (c0 + p)(1 + αR))+
) ≤ Ru′ (w0 − p− (X − (c0 + p))+)
with strict inequality on S(α, p)c ∩ {R 6= 0}. Since P [S(α, p)c ∩ {R 6= 0}] = P [S(α, p)c] > 0, by
the above assumptions, we obtain
E
[
Ru′
(
w0 − p− (X − (c0 + p)(1 + αR))+
)]
< E
[
Ru′
(
w0 − p− (X − (c0 + p))+
)]
= E [R]E
[
u′
(
w0 − p− (X − (c0 + p))+
)]
= 0,
which proves (7).
4 Risk Shifting and Solvency Regulation
In this section, we focus in our analysis of the risk shifting problem on a competitive insurance
market. The shareholder is therefore held at his reservation utility level which is derived from
his outside option of not selling insurance. We assume that the shareholder has only access to
the investment technology if he sells insurance. The shareholder’s participation constraint is thus
given by USH(α, p) ≥ c0.5
Assumption 4.1. Throughout this section, we make the following standing assumptions:
(i) c0 ≥ γcritSH ,
(ii) E[R | X ≤ x] > 0 for all x ∈ (0,∞).
Lemma 4.2. Assumption 4.1(ii) is equivalent to E
[
R 1S(α,p)
]
> 0 for all (α, p) ∈ P, which again
is equivalent to
∂αUSH(α, p) > 0 for all (α, p) ∈ P. (8)
In this case, the assumption in Theorem 3.4 is satisfied.
5Although we focus on a competitive insurance market, we show that all results also hold under the dual problem
with the policyholder’s participation constraint. The results are thus valid for different degrees of competition.
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Proof. It follows by inspection that E
[
R 1{X≤c0+p}
] ≤ E [R 1S(α,p)] for all (α, p) ∈ P. In view of
Lemma A.2, Assumption 4.1(ii) implies (8). Conversely, that (8) implies (ii) follows from setting
α = 0 in (8). Moreover, it follows that the assumption in Theorem 3.4 is satisfied.
Remark 4.3. Assumption 4.1(ii) states that the conditional expected return of the risky asset given
bounded insurance losses is positive. From a risk management point of view, it is important to note
that this moderate assumption is compatible with stress scenarios of negative expected returns under
catastrophic insurance losses. A sufficient condition for (ii) is
E [R | X = x] > 0 for all ess inf X < x < ess supX.
In particular, this sufficient condition holds if the risky asset has a positive unconditional expected
return, E[R] > 0, and R and X are independent.
We now consider the following sequence of events. The policyholder pays a premium p in
exchange for full insurance coverage of X. The shareholder then decides on the fraction α of the
total capital, c0 + p, to be invested in the risky asset.
If the shareholder can commit to an investment policy α before the insurance premium p is
paid, then the optimal investment and premium policy is given by the solution to the following
optimization problem:
max
(α,p)∈P
UPH(α, p)
s.t. USH(α, p) ≥ γSH
(9)
for the shareholder’s reservation utility level γSH = c0. By Theorem 3.2 and Assumption 4.1, the
solution to (9) is Pareto optimal.
We now examine the situation in which the shareholder cannot credibly commit to an invest-
ment policy α before the insurance premium p is paid. That is, after the policyholder has paid the
insurance premium p, the shareholder chooses α by solving the following optimization problem:
max
α∈[0,1]
USH(α, p). (10)
By Lemma 4.2, for any fixed p ∈ (−c0,∞), USH(α, p) is strictly increasing in α. Hence only the
boundary solution is possible, i.e. arg maxα USH(α, p) = 1. The shareholder invests the entire total
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capital in the risky asset.6
The policyholder has rational expectations about this investment strategy and the premium
p has to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint that the shareholder sets the investment
strategy according to optimization problem (10). We can thus formalize the agency problem by
the following constrained optimization problem:
max
(α,p)∈P
UPH(α, p)
s.t. USH(α, p) ≥ γSH ,
α ∈ arg maxα′ USH(α′, p)
(11)
for the shareholder’s reservation utility level γSH = c0. In view of Theorem 3.2 (ii), any solution
of the risk shifting problem (11) is generically Pareto suboptimal.
In the following theorem, we characterize the solution and show that it can be equivalently
derived from maximal shareholder utility constraining on the policyholder’s reservation utility
level.7
Theorem 4.4. For any reservation utility level γSH ∈ ΓSH and γPH ∈ ΓPH , respectively, there
exists a unique solution (α¯, p¯) in P to the constrained optimization problem (11) and to the dual
problem
max
(α,p)∈P
USH(α, p)
s.t. UPH(α, p) ≥ γPH ,
α ∈ arg maxα′ USH(α′, p)
(12)
respectively. This solution satisfies α¯ = 1, and USH(1, p¯) = γSH and UPH(1, p¯) = γPH , respec-
tively. It is Pareto optimal if and only if E [Ru′ (w0 − p¯− (X − (c0 + p¯)(1 +R))+)] ≥ 0.
Moreover, any solution (α¯, p¯) to (11) with γSH = USH(α¯, p¯) ∈ ΓSH is a solution to (12) with
γPH = UPH(α¯, p¯) ∈ ΓPH , and vice versa.
Proof. As seen below (10), for any fixed p ∈ (−c0,∞), we have arg maxα′ USH(α′, p) = 1. Hence
6There is only the boundary solution under the risk shifting problem in our setting due to two features of the
investment technology. First, any fraction α ∈ [0, 1] can be invested in the risky asset. Second, the investment
technology exhibits a linear scale function, i.e., there are no costs other than the agency cost involved in shifting
risk. A strictly concave scale function, as assumed in Green [8] with mutually non-exclusive projects, would imply
that the shareholder overinvests in risk but not necessarily up to the boundary.
7The results thus also apply to other degrees of competition, including a monopolistic insurance market which
is given by the policyholder’s reservation utility level derived from his outside option of not buying insurance, i.e.
γPH = E [u(w0 −X)]. Note that this is covered by the theorem since E [u(w0 −X)] < E [u(w0 + c0 −X)] ≤ γcritPH .
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problem (11) boils down to optimizing the continuous function UPH(1, p) on the interval [p¯,∞)
with p¯ determined by USH(1, p¯) = γSH . Note that γSH ∈ ΓSH is equivalent to p¯ ≥ pcritPH . Thus,
UPH(1, p) is strictly decreasing in p ∈ [p¯,∞). The optimizer of (11) is thus (1, p¯). The first order
condition for Pareto optimality follows from Theorem 3.4, see Lemma 4.2. A similar argument
applies to problem (12). We conclude, in particular, that any solution (1, p¯) to either (11) with
γSH ∈ ΓSH or (12) with γPH ∈ ΓPH satisfies p¯ ≥ pcritPH . The last statement thus follows by
the fact that UPH(1, p) and USH(1, p) are strictly decreasing and increasing in p ∈ [pcritPH ,∞),
respectively.
The inefficiency of the investment and premium policy arises if shareholders cannot credibly
commit to an investment strategy before premiums are paid. Any credible commitment device
for shareholders would thus increase welfare. In the context of corporate finance, Green [8] and
MacMinn [10] have shown that issuing convertible bonds can provide such a commitment device
and eliminate the risk shifting problem.
In our context of insurance there are also various contractual and organizational features that
might provide some form of commitment device. Shareholders can limit the insurer’s risk exposure
by including restrictions on their investment and dividend policies in their corporate charter.
Shareholders could also transfer parts of their assets to an escrow account. These restrictions limit
the extent to which shareholders can increase the insurer’s risk structure and thereby reduce the
inefficiency caused by the risk shifting problem. Along the lines of convertible bonds, participating
policies reduce the benefit to shareholders from increasing the insurer’s risk. The implied benefit
of partially overcoming the risk shifting problem might outweigh the cost of higher exposure for
policyholders to the insurer’s risk. Last, changing the organizational form to a mutual form would
eliminate the risk shifting problem. Under the mutual form, owners who decide on the insurer’s
risk structure coincide with providers of capital. The incentive problem is thereby eliminated at
the cost of less diversified owners.
In the following, we take the insurance contract as given and explore the effect of solvency
regulation on the agency cost of the risk shifting problem. The regulator assesses the riskiness of
the annual loss
L(α, p) = c0 − ((c0 + p)(1 + αR)−X) = −(c0 + p)αR+X − p
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by means of a risk measure ρ. The respective regulatory requirement is that the available capital,
c0, be greater than the required capital, ρ (L(α, p)):
ρ (L(α, p)) ≤ c0.
This capital requirement restricts the set of feasible investment and premium policies. Solvency
capital requirement can thus be interpreted as a commitment device for shareholders imposed by
the regulator.
The risk shifting problem (11) under this additional regulatory constraint is as follows
max
(α,p)∈P
UPH(α, p)
s.t. USH(α, p) ≥ γSH ,
α ∈ arg maxα′ USH(α′, p)
s.t. ρ(L(α′, p)) ≤ c0
(13)
for the shareholder’s reservation utility level γSH = c0.
We make the following standard assumptions for risk measures, see e.g. McNeil et al. [15].
Assumption 4.5. Throughout, ρ satisfies the following conditions:
(i) ρ is cash-invariant, that is, ρ(L + c) = ρ(L) + c for any constant cash amount c ∈ R and
random loss L.
(ii) ρ is convex, that is,
ρ(λL+ (1− λ)L′) ≤ λρ(L) + (1− λ)ρ(L′)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and random losses L, L′.
(iii) ρ is monotone, that is, ρ(L) ≤ ρ(L′) if L ≤ L′.
(iv) ρ(L(α, p)) is continuous in α ∈ [0, 1] for all p ∈ (−c0,∞).
The cash-invariance property of ρ is motivated by its interpretation as regulatory capital re-
quirement. Adding a deterministic cash amount c to the position, the capital requirement is
reduced by the same amount. The economic idea behind the convexity assumption of ρ is that di-
versification by means of combining risks reduces overall risk and therefore the capital requirement.
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This assumption is crucial for the constrained problem (13) to be well-posed. See also Remark 4.7
below. The assumption of monotonicity is economically meaningful since an annual loss greater
in any state of the world should lead to a higher capital requirement. Property (iv) is of technical
nature. It implies that
αρ(p) = sup {α ∈ [0, 1] | ρ(L(α, p)) ≤ c0}
satisfies either ρ(L(αρ(p), p)) = c0, or αρ(p) = 1 if ρ(L(α, p)) ≤ c0 for all α ∈ [0, 1], or αρ(p) = −∞
if ρ(L(α, p)) > c0 for all α ∈ [0, 1].8 Since the shareholder prefers great α, that is, ∂αUSH > 0, we
have that αρ(p) equals the arg max in the regulatory constrained subproblem in (13) given that it
is well-posed, that is, αρ(p) > −∞. Property (iii) implies that ρ(L(α, p)) ≤ ρ(L(α, p′)) if p ≥ p′.
Hence the domain Dα = {p ∈ (−c0,∞) | αρ(p) > −∞} of αρ is either empty or an interval with
supDα =∞. We define the corresponding intervals of feasible utility levels
ΓregSH = {USH(αρ(p), p) | p ∈ Dα}
ΓregPH = {UPH(αρ(p), p) | p ∈ Dα} .
Here is our existence and uniqueness result for the regulatory constrained risk shifting prob-
lem (13).
Theorem 4.6. Assume Dα 6= ∅. For any reservation utility level γSH ∈ ΓregSH and γPH ∈ ΓregPH ,
respectively, there exists a unique solution (αˆ, pˆ) in P to the constrained optimization problem (13)
and to the dual problem
max
(α,p)∈P
USH(α, p)
s.t. UPH(α, p) ≥ γPH ,
α ∈ arg maxα′ USH(α′, p)
s.t. ρ(L(α′, p)) ≤ c0
(14)
respectively. This solution satisfies USH(αˆ, pˆ) ≥ γSH and UPH(αˆ, pˆ) = γPH , respectively, and
ρ(L(αˆ, pˆ)) = c0 if αˆ < 1.
Moreover, any solution (αˆ, pˆ) to (13) with γSH = USH(αˆ, pˆ) ∈ ΓregSH is a solution to (14) with
γPH = UPH(αˆ, pˆ) ∈ ΓregPH , and vice versa.
Proof. We argue in the (v, w)-coordinates introduced in the proof of Theorem 3.3, and define the
8Following the usual convention, we define sup ∅ = −∞.
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corresponding regulator’s risk measurement function
VR(v, w) = ρ(−w − vR+X) = −w + ρ(−vR+X)
for 0 < v ≤ w <∞. It follows by inspection that VR(v, w) = ρ(L(α, p))− c0, and thus VR(v, w) is
continuous in v. Moreover, αρ(p) corresponds to
vρ(w) = sup {v ∈ [0, w] | VR(v, w) ≤ 0} .
In view of Lemmas 4.2 and A.4, we know that ∂vVSH > 0. Hence, any solution (vˆ, wˆ) to (13) or
(14) must be of the form vˆ = vρ(wˆ).
We claim that vρ is a non-decreasing function on (0,∞). Indeed, arguing by contradiction,
suppose that vρ(w
′) < vρ(w) for some w′ > w. Then vρ(w) ∈ [0, w] and there exists some
v ∈ (vρ(w′), vρ(w)] 6= ∅ with VR(v, w) ≤ 0. By cash-invariance of ρ it follows VR(v, w′) = VR(v, w)+
w − w′ < VR(v, w) ≤ 0, which again implies v ≤ vρ(w′), a contradiction. Whence vρ is non-
decreasing. Moreover, since ρ and thus VR is convex, the function vρ : (0,∞) → [−∞,∞) is
concave, and thus continuous on the interior of its domain D = {w ∈ (0,∞) | vρ(w) > −∞} (see
e.g. Rockafellar [19, Theorems 5.3 and 10.1]).
By assumption, D is a non-empty interval with supD =∞. We now analyze the properties of
the policy- and shareholder utility functions along the curve (vρ(w), w) for w ∈ D. First, we claim
that VPH(vρ(w), w) is strictly quasiconcave and continuous in w ∈ D. Indeed, let w1 < w2 < w3
be points in D. Since vρ is concave and non-decreasing, there exists some λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
vρ(w2) = λvρ(w1) + (1 − λ)vρ(w3) and w2 ≤ λw1 + (1 − λ)w3. From this, and since ∂wVPH < 0,
we derive
VPH (vρ(w2), w2) ≥ VPH (λ(vρ(w1), w1) + (1− λ)(vρ(w3), w3)) .
On the other hand, the policyholder utility function, VPH (a+ bw,w), is strictly concave along
straight lines of the form (a+ bw,w) ∈ V, for constant parameters a and b.9 Hence
VPH (λ(vρ(w1), w1) + (1− λ)(vρ(w3), w3)) > min {VPH(vρ(w1), w1), VPH(vρ(w3), w3)} .
9The function u
(
w0 + c0 − w − (X − w − (a+ bw)R))+
)
is concave in w, and strictly concave in w for solvency
states X ≤ w + (a+ bw)R. Taking expectation preserves the strict concavity since P[S(a+ bw,w)] > 0.
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We thus obtain VPH (vρ(w2), w2) > min {VPH(vρ(w1), w1), VPH(vρ(w3), w3)}, which proves the
quasiconcavity of VPH(vρ(w), w). The continuity follows from the continuity of vρ on D. On the
other hand, since ∂vVSH > 0, ∂wVSH > 0, and vρ is concave and non-decreasing, we conclude that
VSH(vρ(w), w) is a strictly increasing continuous function in w ∈ D.
As shown in Lemma A.3 (iii), the policyholder’s level set {VPH ≥ γPH} is compact in V for
any γPH . The theorem now follows by the afore proved properties of the policy- and shareholder
utility functions along the curve (vρ(w), w), w ∈ D.
Remark 4.7. We note that without convexity of ρ, the function vρ(w) and thus VPH(vρ(w), w)
and VSH(vρ(w), w) may fail to be continuous in w. Therefore the maximum of (13) or (14) may
not be attained.
Theorem 4.6 shows that there exists a unique solution to the risk shifting problem under the
regulatory constraints. However, while the policyholder constraint is binding at this investment
and premium policy, the shareholder’s participation constraint may not. The regulatory constraint
is binding for inner solutions (0 ≤ αˆ < 1), but not necessarily for αˆ = 1. From the proof of
Theorem 4.6 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.8. Assume Dα 6= ∅. For any reservation utility level γSH ∈ ΓregSH , there exists a unique
policy (αˆ′, pˆ′) in P which lies on the intersection of the shareholder level curve, USH(αˆ′, pˆ′) = γSH ,
and the regulatory constraint set in (13). That is,
USH(αˆ
′, pˆ′) = max {USH(α′, pˆ′) | ρ(L(α′, pˆ′)) ≤ c0} .
The maximizer (αˆ, pˆ) of (13) satisfies UPH(αˆ, pˆ) ≥ UPH(αˆ′, pˆ′).
We now consider the effect of solvency regulation on the agency cost by comparing the invest-
ment and premium policies and their implied welfare under the risk shifting problem without and
with solvency regulation. While in view of Theorems 3.2 and 4.4, the shareholder’s reservation
utility constraint is binding without solvency regulation, it may not be binding under solvency
regulation (see Theorem 4.6). However, as indicated in Corollary 4.8, it is sufficient for welfare
comparison to compare the policyholder’s utility as a function of α ∈ [0, 1] along the shareholder’s
respective level curve.
In the proof of Theorem 3.4, we have shown that this function can only assume three possible
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shapes. It is either strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing, or attains a global maximum at a
unique critical point α∗ ∈ [0, 1] and is strictly increasing to the left and strictly decreasing to the
right of α∗.
If the policyholder’s utility along the shareholder’s respective level curve is strictly increasing in
α, then the investment policy under the risk shifting problem without solvency regulation, α¯ = 1,
is Pareto optimal, i.e. α∗ = α¯ = 1. Solvency regulation by limiting the investment policy to αˆ′
with
αˆ′ < α∗ = α¯ = 1
reduces the policyholder’s utility and thus welfare.
If the policyholder’s utility along the shareholder’s respective level curve attains a global max-
imum at a unique critical point α∗ ∈ [0, 1), the risk shifting problem leads to a welfare loss. If
solvency regulation implies an investment level αˆ′ which is higher than the Pareto optimal level,
i.e. if
α∗ ≤ αˆ′ < α¯ = 1,
then the policyholder’s utility and thus welfare is higher under the regulatory constraint. This is
because the policyholder’s utility is strictly decreasing for all α ≥ α∗. If solvency regulation is
tighter and implies an investment level which is lower than the Pareto optimal level, i.e. if
αˆ′ < α∗ < α¯ = 1,
then the impact of the regulatory constraint on welfare is ambiguous. This is because the policy-
holder’s utility is strictly increasing for all α ≤ α∗. In particular, for very tight solvency regulation
that restricts the set of investment policies to very low levels, regulation can even further reduce
welfare relative to the risk shifting problem without regulation.
In view of the dual problem in Theorem 4.6, the welfare effect of solvency regulation can be
analogously discussed by comparing the shareholder’s utility as a function of α ∈ [0, 1] along the
policyholder’s respective level curve. Since this function can also only assume the same three
shapes (see Remark 3.5), we obtain the qualitatively identical results.
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5 Numerical Example
In this section we first calibrate our model to the average portfolio of an European Economic Area
non-life insurer taken from the Quantitative Impact Study 3 (QIS3) Benchmarking Study [4] of the
Chief Risk Officer (CRO) Forum. From these data we derive all exogenous model parameters in
our model. In particular, we determine the initial capital c0 and the stochastic model for market
risk R and insurance risk X. We then use our numerical findings to illustrate our analytical results.
The average stand alone capital requirements for stock market investment and insurance risk
under the Solvency II standard model [2, 3] are
SCRmkt = 2, 508 and SCRins = 4, 332,
respectively.10 Under Solvency II, the market investment and insurance risk are assumed to have a
linear correlation coefficient of 0.25. Thus, the diversified total solvency capital requirement equals
SCRtot =
√
SCR2mkt + 2× 0.25× SCRmkt SCRins + SCR2ins = 5, 522.
The Solvency II risk measure ρ is the value-at-risk, VaR99.5%, at the 99.5% confidence level. Thus,
the Solvency II stand alone capital requirement for market risk is determined by
SCRmkt = VaR99.5%
[
market loss = −(c0 + p0)α0R
]
(15)
for some representative premium p0 to be determined below, and the representative investment
policy α0 = 1/7.
11 The Solvency II stand alone capital requirement for insurance risk equals
SCRins = VaR99.5%
[
insurance loss = X − p0
]
. (16)
The Solvency II test demands that the available capital, c0, be greater than or equal to the total
10These figures are derived from the proportion splits of QIS3 capital charges as shown on pages 39, 41, 43 in
the document [4]. The capital requirements are thus normalized such that the undiversified total solvency capital
requirement (SCR) results in 100× 100. The risk class “default” is negligible and the market risk types other than
“equity” have been omitted for simplicity. The final numbers can be extracted from [6], Figure 2 where SCRins is
derived from the SCR for premium risk and catastrophe risk which are assumed to be uncorrelated.
11This number is derived from annual financial statements of non-life insurers.
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solvency capital requirement, SCRtot. We henceforth assume that
SCRtot = c0. (17)
We now specify the stochastic model for market investment risk R and insurance risk X. We
assume that
R = eY − 1 and X = eZ ,
where (Y,Z) is jointly normally distributed with mean (µY , µZ), standard deviations σY , σZ , and
a linear correlation of −0.25.12 Furthermore, we assume that
E[R] = 0.04, var[R] =
(
0.16
)2
. (18)
We use the following premium calculation principle to calibrate the insurance risk parameters
p0 = E[X]. (19)
In solving Equations (15)–(19) we determine the parameters that fully specify our model (c0, µY ,
µZ , σY , σZ).
13
As for the policyholder’s utility function, we assume constant absolute risk aversion.14 Thus,
the policyholder’s expected utility is
UPH(α, p) = −e−βw0 E
[
e−β(−p−(X−(c0+p)(1+αR))
+)
]
,
where β denotes the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Our numerical results are presented in Figures 1, 2, and 3 in Appendix B for different degrees
of risk aversion, β = 10, 30, and 130, respectively. Computation shows that Assumption (4.1) (i)
is satisfied for all three values of β. Moreover, Lemma A.5 ensures that also Assumption (4.1) (ii)
holds. Thus, in view of Lemmas 4.2 and A.2, the shareholder’s utility is increasing in α and p.
12This yields an approximate linear correlation of 0.25 between −R and X.
13 For numerical reasons we normalize Equations (15)–(19) such that c0 + p0 = 1. This does not change the
qualitative aspects of our numerical results.
14We choose constant absolute risk aversion since it allows for negative terminal wealth. Moreover, the risk
preferences are independent of the policyholder’s initial wealth w0. Below we choose w0 in a way that it increases
numerical precision.
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The plots cover a section of the policy space P where α is on the horizontal and p on the vertical
axis. The thin solid and thin dashed lines depict the level curves of the shareholder (LC Sh) and
policyholder (LC Ph) for utility levels γSH and γPH . The policyholder utility is maximal in the
south–west corner of the plots. The thick line characterizes the policy strategies (α, p) that satisfy
the first order condition (3) for Pareto optimality (FOC). We observe that in accordance with
Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 there exists at most one Pareto optimum for every α that is unique for a
specific reservation utility level.
The Pareto optimal policy under perfect competition is labeled with PC. It lies on the share-
holder’s reservation utility level that is equal to his outside option of not selling insurance, γSH = c0.
Analogously, MO labels the Pareto optimal policies in a monopolistic insurance market which is
located on the policyholder’s reservation utility level equal to his outside option of not buying in-
surance, that is, γPH = E [u(w0 −X)] ∈ ΓPH by Lemma A.3. In a frictionless market, depending
on the level of competition the equilibrium solution lies on the FOC between PC and MO.
The dotted and slash-dotted lines are the boundaries of the regulatory constraints ρ (L(α, p)) ≤
c0 under the value-at-risk measure VaR99.5% (VaR) and the expected shortfall measure ES99%
(ES), respectively. The policies that are acceptable to the regulator are to the north-west of these
boundaries. We note that the value-at-risk, VaR99.5%, does not satisfy the convexity property in
Assumption 4.5 in general, see e.g. McNeil et al. [15]. However, in our example it shows convex
behavior for the relevant values of (α, p). For comparison, we also consider the Swiss Solvency Test
[1] regulatory risk measure, which is the expected shortfall15, ES99%, at the 99% confidence level.
The expected shortfall satisfies all properties of Assumption 4.5.
Figure 4 shows the regulatory constraints under the expected shortfall measure ESq at different
confidence levels q = 99, 90, and 60. In a frictionless market with perfect competition the optimal
investment and premium strategy (α∗, p∗) will be obtained at point PC. However, if shareholders
cannot credible commit to an investment strategy the optimal solution (α¯, p¯) is attained at the risk
shifted solution RS with α¯ = 1 as implied by Theorem 4.4. This is harmful to the policyholder since
the policyholder’s utility decreases as (α, p) moves away from the PC along the shareholder’s reser-
vation utility curve. In this case regulation helps. Regulation restricts the set of feasible premium
and investment strategies and might keep the shareholder from excessive risk taking. According
to Theorem 4.6 there exists a unique solution (αˆ, pˆ) for the regulated risk shifting problem. For
15Also known as conditional or tail value-at-risk.
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different confidence levels these solutions are labeled R99, R90, and R60, respectively.16 As can be
seen from Figure 4, regulation improves efficiency under the risk shifting problem for confidence
levels q ∈ [99, 90, 60]. Among the regulatory measures presented in Figure 4, ES90% is optimal.
Solvency requirements are too tight for ES99% and too weak for ES60%.
We have chosen constant absolute risk aversion because it eliminates wealth effects from our
analysis. Unfortunately, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is difficult to interpret since most
empirical studies on estimating risk aversion are based on the assumption of constant relative risk
aversion. Nevertheless, we can observe the behavior of the Pareto optimal point under perfect
competition. We find that, with increasing degree of risk aversion β, the optimal investment in the
stock market reduces while the optimal premium level increases. Moreover, in our example, the
expected shortfall measure implies a more stringent regulatory requirement than the one implied
by the value-at-risk measure. For lower degrees of risk aversion, β = 10 and β = 30, the Pareto
optimal policies do not satisfy the regulatory constraints. For higher degrees of risk aversion, e.g.
β = 130, PC meets the regulatory requirements.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a formal framework to analyze the conflict of interest policyholders and
shareholders of insurance companies face. Increasing the risk of the insurer’s assets and liabilities
raises shareholder value potentially at the expense of policyholders. We characterize investment
strategies and premium policies under Pareto optimality, under the risk shifting problem, and
under solvency regulation. Moreover, we analyze the effect of solvency regulation on the agency
cost of the risk shifting problem.
Solvency capital requirements limit the set of possible risk structures and thereby provide a
commitment device for shareholders imposed by the regulator. There are other possible contractual
or organizational arrangements that serve as commitment devices and thus reduce the agency
cost. Examples include investment and dividend policy restrictions in corporate charters, issuing
participating policies, or changing the organizational form to a mutual insurance company. While
these contractual arrangements reduce the agency cost of the risk shifting problem they add other
trade-offs. In this paper, we took the insurance contract as given and explored how solvency
16The numerical values for α, p and UPH at points of interest can be looked up in Table 1.
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regulation might address the risk shifting problem without distorting insurance contracts.
A Appendix: Lemmas
Lemma A.1. (i) USH(α, p) is convex in α and in p.
(ii) UPH(α, p) is concave in α and strictly concave in p.
Proof. For fixed R = r and X = x, the function ((c0 + p)(1 + αR)−X)+ is convex in p and in α.
Moreover, u (w0 − p− (X − (c0 + p)(1 + αR))+) is concave in p and in α, and strictly concave in
p for solvency states X ≤ (c0 + p)(1 + αR). Taking expectation preserves these properties since
P[S(α, p)] > 0.
Lemma A.2. The derivatives of USH and UPH are given by:
∂αUSH(α, p) = (c0 + p)E
[
R 1S(α,p)
]
∂pUSH(α, p) = E
[
(1 + αR) 1S(α,p)
]
> 0
∂αUPH(α, p) = (c0 + p)E
[
Ru′(w0 − p−X + (c0 + p)(1 + αR)) 1S(α,p)c
]
∂pUPH(α, p) = −u′(w0 − p)P [S(α, p)]
+ αE
[
Ru′(w0 − p−X + (c0 + p)(1 + αR)) 1S(α,p)c
]
for all (α, p) ∈ P.
Proof. We can write
USH(α, p) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ (c0+p)(1+αr)
−∞
((c0 + p)(1 + αr)− x) f(x, r) dx dr
UPH(α, p) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ (c0+p)(1+αr)
−∞
u(w0 − p)f(x, r) dx dr
+
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
(c0+p)(1+αr)
u(w0 − p− x+ (c0 + p)(1 + αr))f(x, r) dx dr
Hence the assertion follows by straightforward formal differentiation as justified by Assumption 2.1.
That ∂pUSH(α, p) > 0 follows from Assumption 2.1(ii).
Lemma A.3. (i) USH(α,−c0) ≡ 0 and limp→∞ infα∈[0,1] USH(α, p) = ∞. Hence the range is
USH(P) = (0,∞).
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(ii) For every level γSH ∈ (0,∞), the level curve {USH = γSH} is a C1-line in P connecting the
{α = 0}- and {α = 1}-axes.
(iii) UPH(α,−c0) ≡ E [u(w0 + c0 −X)] and limp→∞ supα∈[0,1] UPH(α, p) = −∞.
(iv) UPH attains its global supremum at (1, p
crit
PH) . That is,
UPH(1, p
crit
PH) = sup
(α,p)∈P
UPH(α, p). (20)
Moreover, pcritPH > −c0 if and only if E [Ru′(w0 + c0 −X)] > 0.17 In this case, (1, pcritPH) is
the unique maximizer for UPH in P. Hence the range is UPH(P) = ΓPH .
(v) For every level γPH ∈ ΓPH , the level curve {UPH = γPH} is a C1-line in P, connecting the
{α = 0}- and {α = 1}-axes if γPH ≤ E [u(w0 + c0 −X)].
Proof. Most of the stated properties follow straightforward from the definition of USH and UPH ,
and Lemmas A.1 and A.2. We only give details for some of the statements.
Jensen’s inequality implies USH(α, p) ≥ (c0 + p)(1 + αE[R]) ≥ (c0 + p) min{1, 1 + E[R]}. Since
E[R] > −1 we conclude that limp→∞ infα∈[0,1] USH(α, p) =∞, which proves (i).
Next, note that UPH(α, p) ≤ E[u(w0−p)], hence limp→∞ supα∈[0,1] UPH(α, p) = −∞, and UPH
is uniformly bounded on P in particular, whence (iii).
In view of Lemma A.2, UPH cannot have a critical point in the interior of P, and UPH(0, p)
is strictly decreasing in p. On the other hand, UPH(α,−c0) ≡ E[u(w0 + c0 − X)] is constant in
α ∈ [0, 1]. We conclude that UPH(α, p) attains its maximum in (1, pcritPH), which proves (20). Next
we note that P[S(α,−c0)] = P[X ≤ 0] = 0. Hence Lemma A.2 implies that ∂pUPH(α,−c0) =
αE [Ru′(w0 + c0 −X)], and thus pcritPH > −c0 if and only if E [Ru′(w0 + c0 −X)] > 0, whence (iv).
The smoothness properties (ii) and (v) of the level curves follows by the implicit function theo-
rem and the fact that ∇USH and ∇UPH are nowhere zero in P. Finally, UPH(0, p) and UPH(1, p)
are strictly decreasing in p ∈ (−c0,∞) and p ∈ (pcritPH ,∞), respectively, with UPH(0,−c0) =
E [u(w0 + c0 −X)] ≤ γcritPH = UPH(1, pcritPH). Whence level curve {UPH = γPH} connects the
{α = 0}- and {α = 1}-axes if γPH ≤ E [u(w0 + c0 −X)]. The statement on shareholder level
curves follows similarly.
17A sufficient condition for this to hold is E [R | X = x] > 0 for all ess inf X < x < ess supX.
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Lemma A.4. The derivatives of VSH and VPH defined in (4) are given by:
∂vVSH(v, w) = E
[
R 1S(v,w)
]
∂wVSH(v, w) = P [S(v, w)] > 0
∂vVPH(v, w) = E
[
Ru′(w0 + c0 −X + vR) 1S(v,w)c
]
∂wVPH(v, w) = −u′(w0 + c0 − w)P [S(v, w)] < 0
for all 0 ≤ v ≤ w, w ∈ [c0,∞).
Proof. Follows from Lemma A.2 and Assumption 2.1.
Lemma A.5. Let
R = eY − 1 and X = eZ ,
where (Y,Z) is jointly normal distributed with mean (µY , µZ), standard deviations σY , σZ , and
linear correlation coefficient ρ(Y,Z). If E[R] > 0 and ρ(Y,Z) < 0, then
E [R | X ≤ c] > 0 for all c ∈ (0,∞).
Proof. The conditional distribution of Y given Z is normally distributed with mean µY |Z=z =
µY + ρ(Y,Z)
σY
σZ
(z − µZ) and variance σ2Y |Z=z = σ2Y (1 − ρ2(Y,Z)), see e.g. McNeil et al. [15, p. 68].
Hence
E[R | X = x] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(ey − 1)φµY |Z=ln(x),σ2Y |Z=ln(x)(y)dy
where φµ,σ denotes the normal density function with mean µ and variance σ
2. Since (ey − 1) is
strictly increasing in y, ∂xµY |Z=ln(x) ≤ 0, and ∂xσ2Y |Z=ln(x) = 0, we infer that ∂xE[R | X = x] ≤ 0.
Suppose, by contradiction, there exists some c ∈ (0,∞) with E[R | X ≤ c] ≤ 0. Then ∂xE[R |
X = x] ≤ 0 implies that E[R | X = c] ≤ 0 and thus E[R | X = x] ≤ 0 for all x ≥ c. Hence
E[R] = E[R | X ≤ c]P[X ≤ c] + E[R | X > c]P[X > c] ≤ 0 contradicts E[R] > 0.
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B Appendix: Figures and Table
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Figure 1: This Figure shows the numerical results for a coefficient of absolute risk aversion β = 10
in the (α, p)-space. The thin solid lines represent the shareholder’s level curve (LC Sh). The thin
dashed lines represent the policyholder’s level curve (LC Ph). The contract curve (FOC) is depicted
by the thick solid line. The points PC and MO denote the Pareto optimal policies in a perfectly
competitive and in a monopolistic market, respectively. The thick dotted and slash dotted lines
determine the set of feasible policies under the ES99%-measure (ES) and the VaR99.5%-measure
(VaR).
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Figure 2: This Figure shows the numerical results for a coefficient of absolute risk aversion β = 30
in the (α, p)-space. The thin solid lines represent the shareholder’s level curve (LC Sh). The thin
dashed lines represent the policyholder’s level curve (LC Ph). The contract curve (FOC) is depicted
by the thick solid line. The points PC and MO denote the Pareto optimal policies in a perfectly
competitive and in a monopolistic market, respectively. The thick dotted and slash dotted lines
determine the set of feasible policies under the ES99%-measure (ES) and the VaR99.5%-measure
(VaR).
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Figure 3: This Figure shows the numerical results for a coefficient of absolute risk aversion β = 130
in the (α, p)-space. The thin solid lines represent the shareholder’s level curve (LC Sh). The thin
dashed lines represent the policyholder’s level curve (LC Ph). The contract curve (FOC) is depicted
by the thick solid line. The points PC and MO denote the Pareto optimal policies in a perfectly
competitive and in a monopolistic market, respectively. The thick dotted and slash dotted lines
determine the set of feasible policies under the ES99%-measure (ES) and the VaR99.5%-measure
(VaR).
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Figure 4: This Figure shows the regulatory constraints for a coefficient of absolute risk aversion
β = 30 under the expected shortfall measure ESq at different confidence levels q = 99, 90, and
60 for the case of perfect competition. That is, on the shareholder level curve γSH = c0. In this
setting the Pareto optimal policy (α∗, p∗) is labeled with PC, the risk shifted solution is denoted
by RS, and the solutions to the regulated risk shifting problem for different confidence levels are
marked with R99, R90, and R60, respectively.
α p UPH(α, p)
PC = (α∗, p∗) 0.347 0.883 -1.00E-06
R99 = (αˆES99% , pˆES99%) 0.102 0.893 -1.14E-06
R90 = (αˆES90% , pˆES90%) 0.204 0.890 -1.02E-06
R60 = (αˆES60% , pˆES60%) 0.531 0.869 -1.31E-06
RS = (α¯, p¯) 1 0.824 -4.21E-05
Table 1: This Table shows the values of the policy (α, p) and the implied utility of the policyholder
for points of interest marked in Figure 4.
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